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Abstract 
 
A Universal Serial Bus (USB) Mass Storage Device (MSD), often termed a USB flash drive, is 
ubiquitously used to store important information in unencrypted binary format. This low cost 
consumer device is incredibly popular due to its size, large storage capacity and relatively high 
transfer speed. However, if the device is lost or stolen an unauthorized person can easily retrieve all 
the information. Therefore, it is advantageous in many applications to provide security protection so 
that only authorized users can access the stored information. In order to provide security protection 
for a USB MSD, this paper proposes a session key agreement protocol after secure user 
authentication. The main aim of this protocol is to establish session key negotiation through which all 
the information retrieved, stored and transferred to the USB MSD is encrypted. This paper not only 
contributes an efficient protocol, but also does not suffer from the forgery attack and the password 
guessing attack as compared to other protocols in the literature. This paper analyses the security of 
the proposed protocol through a formal analysis which proves that the information is stored 
confidentially and is protected offering strong resilience to relevant security attacks. The 
computational cost and communication cost of the proposed scheme is analyzed and compared to 
related work to show that the proposed scheme has an improved tradeoff for computational cost, 
communication cost and security. 
 
 
Index Terms 
 
Authentication, Security, Biometric, Consumer Storage, Password, MSD, USB. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) is a well-accepted ubiquitous serial interface, typically used for 
connecting peripherals such as keyboards, cell phones, printers, Mass Storage Devices (MSD), etc. to 
a host PC or though USB on-the-go to peer devices, primarily due to high availability and ease of 
connectivity. This ease of connectivity offers many advantages, but it does suffer from significant 
weaknesses such as (1) an unauthorized user could read or steal confidential information easily as all 
the information is stored in a ‘plaintext’ format, specifically unencrypted binary, and (2) an attacker 
could intercept all the information sent over the bus as the channel can be open to the attacker (e.g. 
physical, virus or malware) between the device and the computer. 
 
User authentication and session key agreement is an efficient way to resolve the aforementioned 
difficulties. It is worth noting that all the confidential files and data would then be stored in an 
encrypted form. The established session key from the authentication protocol would be used as an 
encryption key. In this regard, a user authentication and session key agreement protocol should be 
implemented in order to negotiate a session key. Avoiding a verification table at the server end is the 
most desirable property in this regard. Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) method 
[1], proposed by Jablon is a well known Password-Authentication Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol 
which is based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [2]. Subsequently, Hao and 
Shahandashti [3] showed that SPEKE [1] suffered from the impersonation attack and the session key 
negotiation attack. Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) [4] is well known PAKE protocol 
that was proposed by Harkins. In 2000, Hwang and Li [5], and Sun [6] proposed user authentication 
schemes, however Chan and Cheng [7] calculated that Hwang and Li’s scheme [5] suffered from the 
user impersonation attack. Furthermore, Shen, Lin and Hwang [8] subsequently proposed an 
enhanced scheme compared to Hwang and Li’s scheme [5]. In 2004, Ku and Chen [9] proposed a 
password based authentication scheme, but Yoon, Ryu and Yoo [10] showed that Ku and Chen’s 
scheme [9] was vulnerable to the parallel session attack so they proposed a counter measure scheme. 
 
In 2010, Yang, Wu and Chiu [11] proposed an authentication protocol for USB MSDs. However, in 
order to avoid the insider attack and the off-line password guessing attack [12], research focused on 
using user biometrics [13] as a further factor to the user authentication protocol. Li and Hwang [14] 
proposed a biometrics-based remote user authentication scheme in 2010. However, in 2011, Das [15] 
derived that Li and Hwang’s scheme [14] had flaws in the login phase, authentication phase and 
password change phase. To overcome these flaws, Das [15] also proposed an authentication scheme. 
An [16] showed that Das’s scheme [15] cannot resist the server masquerading attack, user 
impersonation attack, password guessing attack and insider attack, and so proposed an improved 
scheme. Li et al. [17] found that An’s scheme [16] suffered from the denial-of-service (DoS) attack, 
the forgery attack and also did not provide forward secrecy. In 2014, He et al. [18] also proposed a 
biometric scheme based on a three-factor security protocol for USB MSDs. In the same year, Jiping 
et al. [19] also proposed a biometric and password based authentication scheme to overcome the 
weaknesses of Das’s scheme [16]. 
 
This paper, shows that the Jiping et al. scheme [19] does suffer from the forgery and password 
guessing attacks. This paper then proposes an efficient Biometric and Password based Secure User 
Authentication Scheme (BPSUAS) for consumer USB MSDs to overcome the weaknesses in the 
current literature. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II a discussion is presented on the basic 
concepts of the cryptographic one-way hash function and biometric extraction mechanism as the 
background for this work. Section III briefly addresses the scheme presented by Jiping et al. [19] and 
the security weaknesses of their scheme is presented in Section IV. Section V presents the 
authentication scheme proposed in this work and the security of the proposed scheme is analyzed in 
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Section VI. Section VII presents the performance evaluation and Section VIII finally concludes the 
paper. TABLE I shows the nomenclature that is used throughout the paper. 
 
TABLE I 
NOMENCLATURE 
Term Usage 
Ui i
th
 user 
S remote server 
A adversary or attacker 
G multiplicative cyclic group of order n 
g generator of group G 
d(·) and 
des(·) 
distance measurement function 
x secret key of server S 
pwi password of user Ui 
Bi   biometric parameter of user Ui 
IDi   identity of user Ui 
ENCk[·] symmetric key encryption by key k 
DECk[·] symmetric key decryption by key k 
SKu or SKs shared secret session key between Ui 
and S 
T current time-stamp 
ΔT estimated time delay 
h(·) cryptographic one-way hash function 
⊕ bitwise xor operation 
|| concatenation operation 
× multiplication operation 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
This section defines the collision resistant cryptographic one-way hash function [20] and the collision 
resistant fuzzy extractor [21], [22] in order to analyze the security of this proposed scheme. 
 
Definition 1: A collision resistant cryptographic one-way hash function  h   maps a binary string of 
an arbitrary length to a binary string of fixed length called the hashed value. It can be symbolized as: 
1 2:h H H , where  
*
1 0,1H  ,    2 0,1
n
H   and n is a positive integer. 1H  is a binary string of an 
arbitrary length and 2H  is a binary string of fixed length n. If  1
H
AAdv t  is the advantage to an 
adversary A to choose a pair  ' 1 1, Rm m H H   randomly such that    'h m h m   where 'mm   for 
the time duration 1t , it can be considered that  1
H
AAdv t  is the probability of the advantage computed 
over the random choices made by A for the time duration 1t . Then,  h   is termed collision-resistant, 
if  1 1
H
AAdv t  , for any small 01  . Thus: 
 
           ' ' '1 1 1, |HA RAdv t Pr m m H H m m h m h m                         (1) 
 
where  Pr E   denotes the random event E. 
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Definition 2: A collision resistant fuzzy extractor can be modeled as a procedure which takes a binary 
string say, b of metric space M as an input, where  0,1
n
M  , for some n bits and produces a random 
string say,  lR 1,0 , for some l bits and an auxiliary string say,  
r
1,0 , for some r bits, where r=l 
or n bits. This mapping procedure is known as GEN and it can be represented by :GEN M    . 
Another procedure which takes a binary string say, 'b  of the metric space  0,1
n
M  , where 'b b  
and a uniform distributed binary string say,  r1,0 , and produces the random string  lR 1,0  is 
known as REP and symbolized as   ': MREP . If  2
FE
AAdv t  is the advantage to A to choose a 
pair   MMbb R ',  randomly such that  ',des b b d ,    'GEN b GEN b  and 
   ' ', ,REP b REP b  , where d is the difference tolerance level and 'bb   for the time duration 2t , it 
can be considered that  2
FE
AAdv t  is the probability that the advantage is computed over the random 
choices made by A over time duration 2t . Then, the Fuzzy Extractor, FE, is called collision-resistant, 
if  2 2
FE
AAdv t  , for any small 2 0  . Thus: 
 
 
     
       
' ' '
2
' ' '
, | ,
, ,
R
FE
A
b b M M b b des b b d
Adv t Pr
GEN b GEN b REP b REP b 
      
 
  
   
 
                  (2) 
 
for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms GEN and REP. 
 
III. BRIEF REVIEW OF THE JIPING ET AL. SCHEME 
 
This section briefly describes the user authentication scheme presented by Jiping et al [19]. Their 
scheme consisted of three main phases being, registration, login and authentication. 
 
A. Registration Phase 
 
i
th 
user iU  inputs their personal biometric parameter iB  (e.g. fingerprint), password ipw  and the 
identity iID  to server S securely. S computes  i iF h B ,  i iG h ID ,  i i iR h pw F   and 
 ||i i iE h G x R  . S stores parameters  , ( ), , , , , .i i i iF h G R E d  into the memory of iU ’s MSD, 
where   is a threshold value and  d   is the difference measurement function. S then sends the USB 
MSD to iU  securely or in person. 
 
B. Login Phase 
 
In the login phase, the user inserts their USB MSD into the client terminal and provides their 
biometric parameter 'iB  to the terminal which subsequently checks condition  ',i id B B  . If the 
condition holds, the terminal gives permission for iU  to provide their password ipw ; otherwise, S 
terminates the session. After receiving ipw , the device computes  
'
i i iR h pw F  . If  ',i id R R   
then the password verification fails, and the terminal aborts the session; otherwise, the MSD 
computes 
1
'
i i iM E R  ,  2 ||i i iM h r T  and 3 1 2i i iM M M   where ir  is a random number chosen by 
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the MSD and iT  is the current login timestamp of iU . Finally, iU  sends a login message 
2 3
, , ,i i i iG M M T  to S over a public channel. 
 
C. Authentication Phase 
 
After receiving the login request message at sT , S first tests the condition  s iT T T   , where T  is 
the estimated time delay. If true, S proceeds to the next stage; otherwise, terminates the session. S 
computes  
1
||s iM h G x , 2 1 3s s iM M M   and tests equality 2 2i sM M . If true then the login 
message is correct; otherwise S aborts the session.   
 
S generates random number sr  and computes  3 ||s s sM h r T , 4 1 3s s sM M M  . S sends the message 
1 3 4
, , ,s s s sM M M T  to iU  over a public channel. 
 
After receiving the message from S at time 1iT , the MSD tests condition  1i sT T T   . If false, the 
session is terminated; otherwise S computes 
4 1 4i s s
M M M   and tests 
4 3i s
M M . If true, the device 
computes 
5 1 3s s i
M M M   and tests 
5 4i s
M M . If true, the device computes  6 2||i i iM h r T  and 
7 6 4i i s
M M M  , where 2iT  is the current timestamp and sends 7
2, ,i i iM r T  to S.  
 
After receiving the message at 1sT , S checks the condition   1 2s iT T T   . If true, S computes 
 5 2||s i iM h r T , 6 5 4s s sM M M   and tests condition 6 7s iM M . If true, S accepts the login 
message from iU ; otherwise rejects the current session. 
 
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE JIPING ET AL. SCHEME 
 
This section considers the forgery attack and off-line password guessing attack using the scheme 
described by Jiping et al. [19]. 
 
A. Forgery Attack 
 
Consider adversary A trapping all the communication messages between iU  and S during execution 
of the protocol. Thus, A will know all the parameters 
2 3 1 3 4 7
2, , , , , , , , , ,i i i i s s s s i i iG M M T M M M T M r T  
from the messages. A can create a forged login message by performing the following steps for any 
timestamp [ ]aiT , where  [ ]as iT T T   : 
 
1. A computes  
[ ]
2
[ ] [ ]
||
forge a a
i ii
M h r T  and 
[ ] [ ] [ ]
3 1 2
forge trap forge
i s i
M M M   where A chooses random 
number [ ]air .  
1
[ ]
||
trap
is
M h G x  is the trapped parameter from the communicating messages 
between iU  and S, and 
[ ]a
iT  is the current timestamp of A. Then, A sends the login message 
[ ] [ ]
2 3
[ ], , ,
forge forge a
i ii i
G M M T  to S. 
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2. After receiving the login message at timestamp sT from A, S tests  [ ]as iT T T    (which will 
always be true.) S computes  
1
||s iM h G x  and 
[ ]
2 1 3
forge
s s i
M M M  . Then, S tests equality 
22
[ ]forge
si
M M . However, it will be always equal because A already knows the correct 
parameter  
1
||s iM h G x  from listening to the messages between iU  and S. 
 
Therefore, the forge login request message satisfies the validity of the authentication of S. Hence, the 
adversary can impersonate a valid user to login to S. 
 
B. Off-line Password Guessing Attack 
 
Adversary A can extract information from the USB MSD by monitoring power analysis [23], [24]. 
Thus, if the USB MSD of iU  is lost or stolen, A can obtain the parameters  , ( ), , , , ,i i i iF h G R E d  . 
Then, A can perform the following steps to guess the password of iU :  
 
Step 1: A chooses a random password [ ]aipw  and computes  [ ] [ ]a a ii iR h pw F  .  
 
Step 2: Then, A tests the equality of [ ]aiR  and stored iR . If true, the passwords 
[ ]a
ipw  and ipw  are the 
same and A has successfully guessed the password of iU ; otherwise, A can repeat Step 1 until correct 
password has been obtained.   
 
After guessing, A can obtain the correct password ipw  of iU  due to the low entropy property of the 
password [18]. Therefore, given time, the scheme from Jiping et al. [19] cannot resist the off-line 
password guessing attack. 
 
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
This section presents the proposed scheme derived from this research. The proposed scheme consists 
of a registration phase, a login phase, an authentication and session key agreement phase, a data 
retrieval phase and then password update phase. 
 
Server S chooses a cryptographic one-way hash function  h   such that when using an arbitrary input 
binary string then a fixed length binary string is created. This process can be symbolized as 
lh }1,0{}1,0{: *  , where l is a fixed length (say, 128 bits) integer. S also chooses a multiplicative 
cyclic group G of order n, a generator g of the group G and a secret key x. Then, S publishes 
 , ,g n h   as the public parameters and keeps x secret. 
 
A. Registration Phase 
 
Whenever iU  wants to access data on their USB MSD through S, then the registration phase is 
invoked. iU  can register to S by:  
 
1. iU  provides their identity iID  to S over the public channel. 
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2. After receiving iID  from iU , S then computes  ||i iD h ID x . Then, S creates a personalized 
USB MSD for user iU  after storing ,i iID D  into the memory of the MSD. S sends the USB 
MSD to iU  securely or in person. 
 
3. A biometric sensor generates a unique biometric parameter iB  (i.e. fingerprint) being a unique 
biometric feature of iU . Password ipw  is obtained. The MSD locally generates 
   ,i i iGEN B   , computes  ||i i i iF h pw ID   ,  ||i i iC h pw  , ii c iK ENC D     and 
 ||i i iG h C D . The MSD stores iii GKF ,,  into the memory of the MSD instead of iD . 
Finally, parameters , , ,i i i iID F K G  are stored into the memory of the MSD. 
 
B. Login Phase 
 
When iU  wants to access the memory of the MSD, iU  inserts the MSD to the client terminal. The 
password ipw  and biometric parameter iB  are also entered to the terminal. After receiving ipw  and 
iB  for iU , the terminal then performs the following steps: 
 
1. The terminal computes  ' ||i i i iF h pw ID   ,  ' ',i i iREP B   ,  ' '||i i iC h pw  , 
'
'
i
i iC
D DEC K     and  ' ' '||i i iG h C D . 
 
2. The terminal tests 'i iG G . If the equality fails then the terminal rejects the login from iU .  
 
3. The MSD computes  1 ' ||i i iM h D T    and  2 '|| || ||i i i iM h ID D T , where Ti  is the current 
login time of iU  and   is a random number selected by the MSD. 
 
4. The terminal sends 
1 2
, , ,i i i i iLM ID M M T  as a login request message to S over the public 
channel. 
 
C. Authentication and Session Key Agreement Phase 
 
In this phase, S and the MSD perform the following steps: 
 
1. After receiving the login request message 
1 2
, , ,i i i i iLM ID M M T  at time sT , S checks the 
format of iID . If valid, S tests  s iT T T   . If false, S rejects the login message. 
 
2. S then computes  * ||i iD h ID x ,  1* * ||i i iM h D T    and  2* * *|| || ||i i i iM h ID D T . 
 
3. Then, S checks the equivalency of 
2
*
iM  and 2iM . If true, iU  can then be authenticated to use S; 
otherwise, S terminates the session. 
 
4. S generates random number   and computes *i iR D   ,  * * 1|| || || ||si i i sM h ID D T  , 
where 1sT  is the current time of S. It computes shared secret session key ngSKs mod
*   . 
Then, it sends a reply message 1, ,si i i sRM M R T  to the MSD of iU . 
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5. After receiving the reply message at time 1iT , the terminal checks condition  1 1i sT T T   . If 
false, the terminal rejects the reply message of S. 
 
6. The MSD computes ' 'i iR D    and  ' ' ' 1|| || || ||si i i sM h ID D T  . Then, the device checks 
equality '
s si i
M M . If true, S can be authenticated to iU . Then, the device computes the shared 
secret session key ngSKu mod
'  
 
7. iU  uses uSK  to encrypt the data as  , uId SKDATA ENC DATA  to ensure the security of the data 
in the MSD memory, computes  '||i i iW h ID   and also stores the encrypted data identity plus 
session key combinations as ,
iW Id u
ENC DATA SK 
 
. 
 
D. Data Retrieval Phase 
 
When iU  wants to access the data in the MSD, iU  inserts their MSD into the client terminal, provides 
their password ipw  and biometric parameter iB  to the terminal. Then the MSD performs steps 1 and 
2 of the login phase. If the submitted iB  and ipw  are deemed correct, the MSD computes 
 '||i i iW h ID   and decrypts the encrypted data identity plus session key combinations as 
 ,i iW W Id uDEC ENC DATA SK    on the MSD to obtain session key uSK . After obtaining uSK , the 
MSD decrypts the encrypted data as   u uSK SKDEC ENC DATA . 
 
E. Password Update Phase 
 
The password update phase is invoked when iU  wants to change their password. 
 
iU  inserts their MSD into the terminal and submits their old password ipw , new password 
[ ]new
ipw  
and iB  to the terminal. The terminal performs following steps to change iU ’s  password: 
 
1. The terminal computes  ' ||i i i iF h pw ID   ,  ' ',i i iREP B   ,  ' '||i i iC h pw  , 
'
ii C i
D DEC K    and  ' ' '||i i iG h C D . 
 
2. The terminal tests for 'i iG G . If false, the terminal rejects iU . 
 
3. Then, the terminal computes  [ ] [ ] '||new new i ii iF h pw ID   ,  [ ] [ ] '||new new ii iC h pw  , 
[ ]
[ ] '
new
i
new
ii C
K ENC D 
 
, and  [ ] [ ] '||new new ii iG h C D . 
 
4. Finally, the terminal replaces iF , iK  and iG  with 
[ ]new
iF , 
[ ]new
iK  and 
[ ]new
iG  respectively into 
the memory of the MSD. 
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VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
The formal security analysis of the proposed scheme under the random oracle model is presented in 
this section. This security analysis uses the formal security analysis under the generic group model of 
cryptography. In the following, this work defines random oracles for the formal security analysis of 
the proposed scheme: 
 
   OracleH is a random oracle which unconditionally outputs the input m for the corresponding 
given hash value y = h(m).  
 
   OracleFE is a random oracle which contains two parts: 
 
1.  OracleFEGEN unconditionally outputs the pair (ψ,θ) from the corresponding given 
biometric parameter b; 
 
2.  OracleFEREP unconditionally outputs ψ from the corresponding biometric parameter bʹ 
and uniform distribution binary string θʹ. 
 
 
Theorem 1: Under the assumption that a cryptographic one-way hash function  h   acts as a random 
oracle, the proposed scheme derived from this work (BPSUAS) is then provably secure against 
adversary A for deriving the secret key x of server S after obtaining the stored information into the 
memory of the MSD, and capturing the login message and the reply message of the authentication 
phase during communication between iU  and S. 
 
Proof 1: Consider A has the ability to derive the secret key x of S. Assume that the MSD of iU  is lost 
or stolen. Thus, A can extract the stored parameters , , ,ID F K Gi i i i  from the memory of the MSD of 
iU  by power monitoring [23], [24]. A also traps the login message 1 2, , ,i i i i iLM ID M M T  and the 
reply message 1, ,si i i sRM M R T  of the authentication phase at timestamp Ti and Ts1 respectively. A 
runs the algorithm derived from this work (BPSUAS), 1
,
oracleALGO
A BPSUAS
 to derive the secret key x of 
S as given in Algorithm 1. Define the success probability of 1
,
oracleALGO
A BPSUAS
 as: 
 
1 11 Pr 1
, ,
oracle oracleSucc ALGO
A BPSUAS A BPSUAS
  
 
  
                     (3) 
 
then the advantage is given by: 
 
    ,1 max 1, ,t qH SuccAoracle oracleAdv A BPSUAS A BPSUAS                      (4) 
 
where the maximum is taken over all A with the execution time t, the number of queries qH made to 
the OracleH oracle. The proposed scheme is said to be provably secure against A deriving the secret 
key x of S if  ,1
,
t qH
oracleAdv
A BPSUAS
 , for any small 0  . According to 1
,
oracleALGO
A BPSUAS
, if A is 
successful in computing the inversion of  h  , then A can successfully derive the secret key x of S by 
using of the OracleH random oracle. But, according to Definition 1 (see Section II), 
  1
OracleHAdv tA  , for any small 01  . Since, the advantage  ,1 , t qH
oracleAdv
A BPSUAS
 , for any 
 10/18 
 
small 0   because the proposed scheme depends on  OracleHAdv tA . Thus, this proposed scheme is 
secure against A for deriving the secret key x of S. 
 
 
Algorithm 1 1
,
oracle
ALGO
A BPSUAS
 
, , , , , , 11 2
Input : , ,
Output: 0 or 1
M M T R M Ti i i i i ss
ID K Gi i i  
1: Calls OracleH  on the input Gi to retrieve the information Di = h(IDi ||                  
     x || b) and Ci = h(pwi || ψi) as ( *iC  || 
*
iD  ) ← OracleH (Gi) 
2: Decrypts Ki  as **
iD = DEC
*
iC
 [ Ki ] 
3: Calls OracleH on the input 
2i
M  to retrieve the information IDi, α, Di, 
    and Ti as ( *iID ||
*  || ***iD  || 
*
iT ) ←  OracleH ( 2iM
) 
4: Computes [h( Di || Ti )]
* = 
1i
M 
*  
5: Calls OracleH on the input [h(Di || Ti)]* to retrieve the information 
     Di and Ti as ( ****
iD || 
**
iT ) ← OracleH ([h(Di || Ti)]
*) 
6: Calls OracleH on the input 
si
M  to retrieve the information IDi, β, α , 
    Di and Ts1 as ( **
iID || β
* || α** || *****
iD || 
****
1sT ) ← OracleH( siM
) 
7: Computes ******
iD = Ri  β
* 
8: if ( *
iD == 
**
iD == 
***
iD == 
****
iD == 
*****
iD == 
******
iD ) then 
9:        Calls OracleH on the input *
iD retrieve the information IDi  and 
            x  as ( ***
iID || x* ) ← OracleH (
*
iD  ) 
10:       if (IDi  == ***
iID ) then 
11:                Accepts x* as correct secret key of server S 
12:                Return 1 (success) 
13:       else 
14:                Return 0 (failure) 
15:       end if 
16: else 
17:       Return 0 (failure) 
18: end if 
  
  
 
 
Theorem 2: Under the assumption that  h   and FE act as a random oracle, this proposed scheme is 
provably secure against adversary A for deriving the password ipw  of iU  after obtaining the stored 
information in the MSD, and capturing the login message and reply message of the authentication 
phase during communication between iU  and S. 
 
Proof 2: Construct A that has the ability to derive ipw  of iU . Consider the same assumptions as 
stated in the proof of Theorem 1. A runs the algorithm, 2
,
oracleALGO
A BPSUAS
 to derive the password 
ipw  of iU  as given in Algorithm 2. Due to the need to query two oracles, define the success 
probability of 2
,
oracleALGO
A BPSUAS
 as: 
 
1 12 2Pr 2
, ,
oracle oracleSucc ALGO
A BPSUAS A BPSUAS
  
 
  
                     (5) 
 
then the advantage is given by: 
 
   , , 22 max, ,t qH qFE SuccAoracle oracleAdv A BPSUAS A BPSUAS                    (6) 
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where the maximum is taken over all A with the execution time t, the number of queries qH made to 
the OracleH oracle and the number of queries qFE made to the OracleFE. The proposed scheme is 
said to be provably secure against A deriving ipw  of iU  if  , ,2 , t qH qFE
oracle
Adv A BPSUAS  , for any 
small 0  . According to algorithm 2
,
oracleALGO
A BPSUAS
 (see Algorithm 2), if A has success 
computing the inversion of  h   and gets the same pair  ',i iB B  such that 'i   then A can 
successfully derive ipw  of iU  by using of the OracleH  random oracle and by querying to the 
OracleFE  respectively. But, according to Definition 1 and Definition 2,   1
OracleHAdv tA  , for any 
small 1 0   and   2
OracleFEAdv tA  , for any small 2 0  . Since, advantage 
 , ,2
,
t qH qFE
oracleAdv
A BPSUAS
 , for any small 0   because this proposed scheme depends on both 
 OracleHAdv tA  and  
OracleFEAdv tA . Thus, the proposed scheme is secure against A for deriving 
ipw  of iU . 
 
 
Algorithm 2 2
,
oracle
ALGO
A BPSUAS
 
Input : , , ,
Output: 0 or 1
ID K F Gi i i i  
1: Calls OracleH  on the input Gi to retrieve the information Di = h(IDi ||                  
     x || b) and Ci = h(pwi || ψi) as ( *iC  || 
*
iD  ) ← OracleH (Gi) 
2: Decrypts Ki  as **iD = DEC
*
iC
 [ Ki ] 
3: if ( *
iD == 
**
iD ) then 
4:        Calls OracleH on the input *
iC to retrieve the information pwi and 
           Ψi as ( * *||i iPW  ) ← OracleH(
*
iC ) 
5: else 
6:        Return 0 (failure) 
7: end if 
8: Chooses *
iB , and calls OracleFEGEN on the input 
*
iB to retrieve the 
     information ψi and θi as ( ** *,i i  ) ← OracleFEGEN (
*
iB ) 
9: if ( **
i ==
*
i ) then 
10:      Computes [h(pwi || IDi)]
*
 = Fi  *i  
11:      Calls OracleH on the input [h(pwi || IDi)]* retrieve the information  
            PWi and IDi as ( **iPW ||
*
iID ) ← OracleH ([h(pwi || IDi)]
*
 ) 
12:       if ( **
iPW  == 
*
iPW ) && (IDi  ==
**
iID ) then 
13:                Return 1 (success) 
14:       else 
15:                Return 0 (failure) 
16:       end if 
17: else 
18:       Return 0 (failure) 
19: end if 
  
 
 
Theorem 3: Under the assumption that  h   acts as a random oracle, then this proposed scheme is 
provably secure against A deriving the shared secret session key SK between iU  and S after obtaining 
the stored information into the memory of the MSD device, and trapping the login message and reply 
message of authentication phase during communication between iU  and S. 
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Proof 3: Construct adversary A that has the ability to derive the shared secret session key SK between 
iU  and S. Consider the same assumptions as stated in the proof of Theorem 1. A runs algorithm 
3
,
oracleALGO
A BPSUAS
 to derive the secret shared session key SK between iU  and S as given in 
Algorithm 3. Define the success probability of 3
,
oracleALGO
A BPSUAS
 as: 
 
1 13 Pr 3
, ,
oracle oracleSucc ALGO
A BPSUAS A BPSUAS
  
 
  
                     (7) 
 
then the advantage is given by 
 
   ,3 max 3, ,t qH SuccAoracle oracleAdv A BPSUAS A BPSUAS                      (8) 
 
where the maximum is taken over all A with the execution time t, the number of queries qH made to 
the OracleH oracle. The proposed scheme is said to be provably secure against A deriving the shared 
secret key SK between iU  and S if  ,3 , t qH
oracleAdv
A BPSUAS
 , for any small 0  . According to 
3
,
oracleALGO
A BPSUAS
 (see Algorithm 3), if A is successful in computing the inversion of  h   then they 
can successfully derive the shared secret key SK between iU  and S by using the OracleH random 
oracle. But, according to the Definition 1  ) 1
OracleHAdv tA  , for any small 1 0  . Since 
 ,3
,
t qH
oracleAdv
A BPSUAS
 , for any small 0   and because the proposed scheme depends on 
 OracleHAdv tA , then the proposed scheme is secure against A deriving the shared secret key SK 
between iU  and S. 
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Algorithm 3 3
,
oracle
ALGO
A BPSUAS
 
, , , , , , , ,11 2
Input : , ,
Output: 0 or 1
M M T R M T n gi i i i i ss
ID K Gi i i  
1: Calls OracleH  on the input Gi to retrieve the information Di = h(IDi ||                  
     x || b) and Ci = h(pwi || ψi) as ( *iC  || 
*
iD  ) ← OracleH (Gi) 
2: Decrypts Ki  as **
iD = DEC
*
iC
 [ Ki ] 
3: Calls OracleH on the input 
2i
M  to retrieve the information IDi, α, Di, 
     and Ti as ( *iID ||
*  || ***iD  || 
*
iT ) ←  OracleH ( 2iM
) 
4: Computes [h( Di || Ti )]
* = 
1i
M 
*  
5: Calls OracleH on the input [h(Di || Ti)]* to retrieve the information 
     Di and Ti as ( ****
iD || 
**
iT ) ← OracleH ([h(Di || Ti)]
*) 
6: Calls OracleH on the input 
si
M  to retrieve the information IDi, β, α , 
    Di and Ts1 as ( **
iID || β
* || α** || *****
iD || 
****
1sT ) ← OracleH( siM
) 
7: Computes ******
iD = Ri  β
* 
8: if ( *
iD == 
**
iD == 
***
iD == 
****
iD == 
*****
iD == 
******
iD )  &&  
(
iID ==
**
iID ==
*
iID ) && (
**
iT ==
*
iT == iT ) && (
*
1sT == 1sT ) then 
9:           Computes 
* ** modSK g n   
10:         Computes 
** *** modSK g n         
11:         if ( *SK == **SK ) then 
12:                Return 1 (success) 
13:       else 
14:                Return 0 (failure) 
15:       end if 
16: else 
17:       Return 0 (failure) 
18: end if 
  
 
A. Discussion of the Presented Theorems 
 
Theorem 2 demonstrated that the proposed scheme is secure against the off-line password guessing 
attack. Theorem 3 demonstrates that the proposed scheme is secure against the session key recovery 
attack because, without knowing random numbers α and β then A cannot compute the session key 
SKu. In the proposed scheme, all communicating messages depend on random numbers α or β and the 
time-stamp. So, all the communication messages are guaranteed to be different for every session. 
Thus, A cannot mount a replay attack on this proposed scheme. In this proposed scheme, A cannot 
mount a forgery attack without knowing secret password ipw  of iU , the secret key x of the server S 
and random numbers α and β generated by iU  and S respectively. Theorems 1 and 2 show that the 
secret information of the server and the user are secure from A. Thus, it is infeasible to mount a 
forgery attack on this proposed scheme. In this proposed scheme, iU  does not need to send their 
password ipw  to S in the registration phase and also for authentication purposes. Thus, the server has 
no knowledge of iU ’s password ipw . Without knowing iU ’s ipw , then S cannot apply iU ’s ipw  to 
another server S
[a]
 to get service from S
[a]
 by accessing the MSD of user iU . Therefore, this proposed 
scheme is secure against the insider attack. 
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VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
This section compares the performance of the proposed scheme with related schemes in the literature 
[1], [4], [11], [14]-[16], [18], [19]. The login and authentication phases of the proposed scheme have 
been compared with the related existing schemes in the literature [11], [14]-[16], [18], [19] because 
these phases are commonly used. 
 
TABLE II presents the communication (overhead) and storage costs of this work compared to the 
literature. As can be seen, while the communication cost of this work is higher than the literature due 
to the session management overhead (required to solve the vulnerabilities in the literature), the 
storage cost is comparable to the literature.  
 
 
TABLE II 
COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION AND STORAGE COSTS OF SCHEMES IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE COMPARED TO THIS PROPOSED 
SCHEME 
Comparison Metric 
SPEKE 
[1] 
SAE 
[4] 
Yang et al. 
[11] 
Li and Hwang 
[14] 
Das 
[15] 
An 
[16] 
He et al. 
[18] 
Jiping et al. 
[19] 
Proposed 
scheme 
(BPSUAS) 
Communication Cost(bits) 2304 4352 4672 576 832 704 1216 1408 
896 
832 
Storage Cost(bits) - - 2176 448 576 576  384 448 
 
 
TABLE III verifies the types of attacks that are considered, the key management and the 
authentication that the literature uses compared to this work. 
 
 
TABLE II 
COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION AND STORAGE COSTS OF SCHEMES IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE COMPARED TO THIS PROPOSED 
SCHEME 
Comparison Metric 
SPEKE 
[1] 
SAE 
[4] 
Yang et al. 
[11] 
Li and Hwang 
[14] 
Das 
[15] 
An 
[16] 
He et al. 
[18] 
Jiping et al. 
[19] 
Proposed 
scheme 
(BPSUAS) 
Communication Cost(bits) 2304 4352 4672 576 832 704 1216 1408 
896 
832 
Storage Cost(bits) - - 2176 448 576 576  384 448 
 
 
TABLE IV presents the computational cost of this work compared to the literature. Th is the time 
required for the hashing operation, Te for exponentiation operation and Tenc/Tdec for the symmetric key 
encryption/decryption operation. Typically, the time complexity associated with these operations can 
be expressed as Te>Tdec/Tenc≈Th [25]. Although the proposed scheme has high time complexity than 
the literature, the proposed scheme can resist the attacks as detailed in TABLE III. 
 
 
TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF ATTACK VULNERABILITY AND FEATURES OF SCHEMES IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE COMPARED TO THIS 
PROPOSED SCHEME 
Attack Vulnerability / Feature 
SPEKE 
[1] 
SAE 
[4] 
Yang et al. 
[11] 
Li and 
Hwang 
[14] 
Das 
[15] 
An 
[16] 
He et al. 
[18] 
Jiping et al. 
[19] 
Proposed 
Scheme 
(BPSUAS) 
Forgery attack yes no No yes yes yes no yes no 
Insider attack - - Yes yes yes no no yes no 
Off-line password guessing attack no no No yes yes no no yes no 
Inefficient login phase - - Yes yes no yes no no no 
Replay attack no no Yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
Session key agreement yes yes Yes no no no yes no yes 
Mutual authentication no yes Yes no no no yes no yes 
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Taking the practical and reasonable assumption that the length of the identity iID  and password 
ipw  parameters are 64 bits each; cryptographic one-way hash function ( )h  , symmetric key 
encryption/decryption, time-stamp and random numbers returns 128 bits each, g
α
 and g
β
 returns 1024 
bits each, then in this research only  64 6 128 832    bits are needed for communications overhead. 
Therefore this work has a lower communications overhead than the Yang et al. [11], Jiping et al. [19] 
and He et al. [18] schemes. The low communications cost compared to the wide range of attacks that 
can be resisted means that the proposed scheme offers an improved trade-off with the computational 
cost, communication cost and security than in the literature. This scheme is therefore a practical 
solution for USB MSD security. 
 
 
TABLE IV 
COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL COST OF RELATED SCHEMES COMPARED TO THIS PROPOSED SCHEME 
Phase Entity 
Login 
(USB MSD) 
Authentication 
(USB MSD) 
 
+ Session Key 
(Server) 
 
Total 
 
SPEKE [1] - 2Te +3Th  2Te +3Th 4Te +6Th 
SAE [4] - 3Te +1Th  3Te +1Th 6Te +2Th 
Yang et al. [11] 1Th+2Te 2Te+1Tdec +2Th  6Te+3Th +1Tenc 10Te+2Tdec/enc +7Th 
Li and Hwang [14] 2Th 2Th  3Th 7Th 
Das [15] 3Th 3Th  5Th 11Th 
An [16] 3Th 2Th  4Th 9Th 
He et al. [18] 4Th 2Th+1Tdec  5Th+1Tenc 11Th+2Tenc/dec 
Jiping et al. [19] 3Th 3Th  5Th 11Th 
Proposed scheme 5Th+1Tdec 1Th+1Te  4Th+1Te 10Th+2Te+1Tdec 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has enhanced the current state of the art in biometric security algorithms by defending 
against the forgery attack, the off-line password guessing attack and the replay attack. An efficient 
mutual authentication protocol has been presented in order to negotiate session keys which were used 
to encrypt data for a USB MSD device enabling secure “USB memory sticks”. Moreover, the paper 
has formally proved that the proposed protocol can withstand all the relevant security weaknesses. A 
performance comparison has also been made with the literature to confirm that the proposed scheme 
achieves a comparatively better trade-off among computation cost, communication cost and security 
than other related schemes. The overall efficiency demonstrates that USB based Mass Storage 
Devices (MSDs) with biometric security sensors can be implemented in order to provide significant 
security for the consumer and beyond. 
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